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Abstract 
 
In recent years, wireless networks have become 
increasingly common and an increasing number of 
devices are communicating with each other over 
lossy links. Unfortunately, TCP performs poorly 
over lossy links as it is unable to differentiate the 
loss due to packet corruption from that due to con-
gestion. In this paper, we present an extension to 
TCP which enables TCP to distinguish packet cor-
ruption from congestion in lossy environments re-
sulting in improved performance. We refer to this 
extension as the HeAder ChecKsum option 
(HACK). We implemented our algorithm in the 
Linux kernel and performed various tests to deter-
mine its effectiveness. Our results have shown that 
HACK performs substantially better than both 
SACK and NewReno in cases where burst corrup-
tions are frequent. We also found that HACK can 
co-exist very nicely with SACK and performs even 
better with SACK enabled. 
 
 
Keywords: Protocol Design, Protocol Analysis, 
Wireless Networks 
 
1 Introduction 
 
There has been a proliferation in the use of mobile 
computing in the last few years. More and more 
devices are talking to each other via lossy links. 
Lossy environments are characterised by high bit 
error rates as opposed to wired networks where the 
bit error rate is very low. They are also usually 
served by low bandwidth links and experience long 
delays during handoff periods. As a result, it has 
become vital that the network protocols used to 
interconnect these devices understand and operate 
well in these lossy environments. 
 
The de-facto network protocol stack used for com-
munications is the TCP/IP stack. This stack couples 
a best effort network layer (IP) with either a reli-
able (TCP) or an unreliable (UDP) transport layer. 
The majority of applications on the Internet use the 
TCP/IP stack as the basis for their transactions.  
 
However, TCP was designed to optimise its per-
formance to deal with packet losses in the network 
due to congestion [Jac88]. It is unable to determine 
if a packet loss is due to congestion or corruption of 
the packet due to errors in the network. As a result, 
TCP generally performs poorly in lossy environ-
ments as it interprets packet corruption as conges-
tion in the network. Thus instead of increasing or, 
at least, maintaining its sending rate to overcome 
these errors due to corruption, TCP will decrease its 
sending rate to reduce, what it perceives as, conges-
tion in the network. This reduction in sending rate 
results in low throughputs for bulk transfers. 
 
In this paper, we propose a modification to the TCP 
[RFC793][RFC2581][S94] protocol that allows it 
to perform better in lossy environments.  We base 
our solution on the premise that when packet cor-
ruption occurs, it is more likely that the packet cor-
ruption occurs in the data and not the header por-
tion of the packet. This is because the data portion 
of a packet is usually much larger than the header 
portion for many applications over typical MTUs. 
With this knowledge, we have devised an algorithm 
by which TCP is able to recover these uncorrupted 
headers and thus determine that packet corruption 
and not congestion has taken place in the network. 
TCP can then react appropriately. We do this by 
introducing two TCP options: the first option is for 
data packets and contains the 1’s-complement 16-
bit checksum of the TCP header (and pseudo-IP 
header) while the second is for  ACKs and contains 
 2
the sequence number of the TCP segment that was 
corrupted. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We 
discuss some related work in Section 2, followed 
by a description of the details and dynamics of our 
extension to the TCP protocol in Section 3.  Section 
4 will describe our implementation while Section 5 
presents the results of our experiments. We discuss 
some possible deployment strategies of our proto-
col in Section 6. Section 7 will detail our future 
plans and we conclude with a summary in Section 
8. 
 
 
2 Related Work 
 
There has been an incredible number of techniques 
developed for TCP over the past decade facilitating 
fast and efficient recovery from packet losses in 
general.  
 
The fast retransmit algorithm [RFC2581] interprets 
incoming duplicate acknowledgements as an indi-
cation of packet loss and retransmits the packet in-
dicated by the ACKs while avoiding timeouts. 
However, if two or more packets have been lost 
from a window, the fast retransmission will not be 
able to recover the losses without waiting for a 
timeout. NewReno [Hoe95][Hoe96][RFC2582] 
introduces the concept of fast retransmission phase, 
which starts on detection of a packet loss and ends 
when the receiver acknowledges reception of all 
data transmitted at the start of the retransmission 
phase. The sender assumes reception of a partial 
ACK during the fast retransmission phase as an 
indication that another packet has been lost within 
the window, and retransmits it immediately. With 
the Selective Acknowledgement (SACK) option  
[RFC2018] enabled, the receiver sends duplicate 
ACKs containing the segment numbers of the 
packets it has received. This allows the transmitter 
to selectively retransmit only lost packets, without 
retransmitting already SACKed packets. 
 
Packet loss due to corruption is more common over 
satellite and wireless networks than wired networks 
and there have been a number of initiatives in tack-
ling this problem. 
 
A common solution is to add Forward Error 
Correction (FEC) to the data being sent over lossy 
links. [RFC2488] covers the issues in using FEC to 
improve the performance of satellite links. The In-
direct-TCP (I-TCP) protocol [BB] splits a TCP 
connection between a fixed and mobile host into 
two separate connections and hides TCP from the 
lossy link by using a protocol optimised for lossy 
links. The SNOOP protocol [BSAK] caches pack-
ets at the base station and performs local retrans-
missions over the lossy link. 
 
The use of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) 
[Flo94][RFC2481] in the TCP/IP protocol enables 
routers to inform TCP senders about the onset of 
congestion and may assist in distinguishing packet 
losses due to congestion and corruption. Other ex-
plicit notification schemes include Explicit Loss 
Notification (ELN) [BPSK] and Explicit Bad State 
Notification (EBSN) [BKVP]. 
 
3 TCP Header Checksum Option 
 
We extended TCP by including two additional TCP 
options. The first (see Fig. 1) is both an enabling 
option used in SYN segments as well as the Header 
Checksum option used in data segments. When the 
option is used in a SYN segment, it is an indication 
that the Header Checksum option can be used once 
the connection is established (the value of the op-
tion field is ignored in this case).  When used in 
data segments, the option field contains the 16 bit 
1’s complement checksum of the TCP header and 
the pseudo-IP header. The second option (see Fig. 
2) is the Header Checksum ACK option which is 
included in ‘special’ ACKs generated in response 
to packet corruption. 
 
 
 
Kind=14 
 
 
Length=4 
1’s complement checksum 
of TCP header and 
pseudo-IP header 
 
 
 
 
 
Kind=15 
 
 
Length=6 
32-bit sequence number of 
corrupted segment to re-
send 
 
 
 
 
Normally, TCP carries only one checksum, which 
is for the entire TCP segment. If this checksum 
fails due to packet corruption, the entire segment is 
discarded. However, in many cases, the headers of 
the corrupted TCP segment are still recoverable as 
the corruption might have occurred in the data por-
tion alone. Hence, by adding a separate checksum 
Fig. 2: TCP Header Checksum ACK option 
Fig. 1: TCP Header Checksum option 
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for the header portion of the TCP segment, the TCP 
receiver will be able to check the integrity of the 
header. By recovering this header, the receiver is 
able to send a ‘special’ ACK back to the TCP 
sender indicating packet corruption. This ACK will 
contain the sequence number of the corrupted 
packet in the option field. This ACK is identical to 
normal ACKs except for the additional option.  
 
We modified the data processing algorithms of the  
TCP sender and receiver and the ACK processing 
algorithm of the TCP sender to incorporate our new 
Header Checksum options, which are explained in 
the following subsections.  
 
  
3.1 Modifications to the TCP sender 
 
When sending out data segments, our modified 
TCP stack first checks if the Header Checksum op-
tion has been negotiated. If the option has not been 
negotiated, the TCP sender proceeds as per normal. 
Otherwise, it will compute the header checksum for 
that data segment and place it into the option field 
of the Header Checksum option. The rest of the 
data sending algorithm is as per normal.  
 
3.2 Modifications to the TCP receiver 
 
When the TCP receiver receives a packet, it verifies 
the integrity of the segment using the standard TCP 
checksum. If the segment is uncorrupted, it is proc-
essed as per normal. However, if it is corrupted, the 
modified TCP stack does the following: 
 
1) Verify the integrity of the header of the cor-
rupted segment using the value of the header 
checksum contained in the option field. 
2) If the header is corrupted, the segment is dis-
carded and no further processing is done. 
3) If the header is intact, the ‘special’ ACK is sent 
to the sender of the corrupted packet. This 
ACK will contain the Header Checksum ACK 
option indicating to the sender that this ACK 
was generated in response to packet corruption. 
It contains the sequence number of the cor-
rupted segment in the option field, thus allow-
ing the sender to selectively retransmit only the 
segment that was corrupted. 
 
 
3.3 Modifications to the ACK processing 
 
When the TCP sender receives an ACK, it checks if 
the Header Checksum ACK option is present. If the 
option is not there, it indicates that this is a normal 
ACK and the sender processes it as per normal. 
However, if the option field is set, the stack does 
the following: 
 TCP segment cor-
rupted? 
Continue as per normal 
1) Recover sequence number of corrupted segment from 
header.  
2) Generate ‘special’ ACK (option 15) containing the 
sequence number of the corrupted segment. 
Yes 
No 
Data segment  
received 
 Header portion 
corrupted? 
Discard Packet 
Yes 
No 
Fig 4. Modifications to the TCP receiver 
 
 Header checksum 
option enabled? 
Continue as per normal 
1) Calculate header checksum of segment 
2) Continue as per normal 
Yes 
No 
Data segment 
to be sent 
Fig 3. Modifications to the TCP sender 
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1) The sequence number of the corrupted segment 
triggering this ACK is obtained from the 
Header Checksum ACK option field. 
2) The TCP retransmission algorithm is called to 
selectively retransmit the corrupted segment. 
These retransmissions are done at rates permit-
ted by the current congestion window (cwnd). 
3) No further processing is done unlike the case of 
normal TCP ACKs. 
 
These ‘special’ ACKs do not indicate congestion in 
the network. Hence, the TCP sender does not halve 
it’s cwnd if it receives multiple ‘special’ ACKs 
with the same value in the ACK field (for e.g., 
ACKs generated in response to corruption in con-
secutive segments. These ACKs will have the same 
value in the ACK field but different values in the 
Header Checksum ACK option field).  
 
4 Implementation and Experimental Setup 
 
We incorporated our Header Checksum options and 
the necessary changes to the TCP algorithm in the 
Linux kernel version 2.2.10. This modified version 
of the Linux kernel was installed on our experimen-
tal testbed consisting of Celeron 300A machines 
with 128 megabytes of RAM each. The machines 
were connected using Intel Ether-Express Pro 100 
(set to 10 Mbps) network cards. The experimental 
testbed is shown in Fig. 6. 
  
We ran our experiments by sending TCP bulk data 
from the client to the server. We used iperf [BC98] 
to generate this data. The error / delay box was 
used to corrupt and delay packets in the network to 
simulate lossy and long latency environments,  
 
respectively. Random as well as bursty packet er-
rors were generated using packet corruption soft-
ware and the amount and location of the corrup-
tions within a packet were all randomised. For our 
experiments, errors were generated only to packets 
travelling on the forward path. Packets on the re-
verse path (the ACK packets from the server to the 
client) were not corrupted.  
 
We modified the device drivers of the ethernet 
cards to stop them from discarding packets that 
failed the packet CRC checks. As a result, cor-
rupted packets arriving at the network cards were 
passed up to the TCP/IP stack without being dis-
carded. 
 
5 Results and Discussions 
 
To test the effectiveness of HACK, we ran a variety 
of test scenarios.  These scenarios were designed to 
test the performance of HACK under various lossy 
environments. We chose NewReno and SACK for 
comparison as Linux implements both of them and 
they are acclaimed as the “best” basic and extended 
commodity TCP implementations, respectively 
[BHZ][FF96][RFC2582]. 
 
 
5.1 Random Bit Errors 
 
In the first experiment, we compare the perform-
ance of HACK with SACK (on top of NewReno) 
and NewReno (default TCP stack in Linux 2.2.10) 
in the presence of white noise, i.e., in a scenario 
where the error condition is characterized by sharp 
spikes causing single bit corruptions. We have 
translated this bit error profile into packet errors 
(Our packet corruption probabilities range from 
2% to 15% corresponding to a bit error range of 
1x10-6 to 1x10-5). We ran the experiment over a low 
latency link (10 ms end-to-end delay) by sending 2 
MB of TCP bulk data from the client to the server 
and over a long latency link (300 ms end-to-end 
delay, e.g., satellite link) by sending 256 KB of 
TCP bulk data from the client to the server. In the 
Client 
 
Server 
 
Error / Delay Box 
 
Fig 6. Experimental testbed 
 
 Option 15 present 
in the segment? 
Continue as per normal 
1) Extract sequence number of corrupted segment 
2) Selectively retransmit the segment  
3) ACK is discarded without further processing 
Yes 
No 
ACK segment 
received 
Fig 5. Modification to the ACK processing 
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later case, we used 256KB to reduce experiment 
time as 2 MB was taking too long to complete. We 
repeated the experiment five times for each TCP/IP 
stack and for each packet corruption probability. 
The TCP window size was set high enough that it 
was not a limiting factor for either latency. The 
results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 8 for 
the low latency link and in Fig. 9 for the long la-
tency link.  Fig. 7 shows the average number of 
slow starts experienced by the various TCP imple-
mentations over the long latency link.  
 
As can be seen, both SACK and HACK perform 
better than NewReno for both latencies. They also 
experience less slow starts than NewReno. These 
results were due to the selective ACK feature of 
SACK (which enabled SACK to do more intelli-
gent and efficient retransmissions of lost packets) 
and the ability of HACK to recover useful informa-
tion from corrupted packets. Hence, we exclude 
NewReno from all further experiments and only 
show the comparison between SACK and HACK. 
The performance of both SACK and HACK are 
comparable in the situation where white noise is 
prevalent. The best performance is achieved when 
we combine both HACK and SACK together.  This 
will be discussed further later. 
 
5.2 Burst Errors 
 
We next ran experiments to compare the perform-
ance of SACK and HACK in bursty error condi-
tions. Multi-packet random burst errors with burst 
lengths ranging from 2 to 10 packets were consid-
ered. We ran this experiment over the long latency 
link with the window size set high enough not to be 
a limiting factor  
Figs. 10 – 13 show the results of the various TCP 
schemes under different burst error lengths for 2%, 
5%, 10% and 15% burst error probabilities respec-
tively.  From the graphs, it can be seen that HACK 
performs substantially better than SACK in the 
Fig. 7: Average number of slow-starts for long latency link with random 
single packet errors 
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presence of bursty errors. This is because SACK is 
unable to respond when it loses too many packets 
in a row and thus it times out frequently. HACK is 
better in this respect as it can recover some of the 
headers of the corrupted packets and use those 
headers to generate ACKs and keep the pipe flow-
ing. As expected, HACK performs better with 
SACK activated than without SACK. This is be-
cause HACK is able to leverage upon the out of 
order packet retransmission algorithms in SACK. 
HACK creates these out of order situations as it 
may not be able to recover the headers of all the 
packets corrupted in a burst due to the random na-
ture of the bit errors within each packet. For exam-
ple, if say 5 packets are corrupted, HACK may only 
be able to recover the headers of packets 2, 4 and 5 
with packets 1 and 3 being irretrievable.  This cre-
ates gaps in the receiving window, as HACK will 
only ask for retransmissions of the packets whose 
headers it can recover.  However, if SACK is acti-
vated, these gaps will be detected and handled ac-
cordingly. Another example would be as follows; 
suppose the TCP receiver receives segments x+1, 
x+2 and x+3 correctly but segment x is corrupted. 
In this case, the receiver will generate one ‘special’ 
ACK in response to segment x and three normal 
ACKs in response to segments x+1, x+2 and x+3. 
However, the three normal ACKs will appear to the 
TCP sender as dupacks as they all will be acknowl-
edging segment x (the next segment expected by 
the receiver). Hence, the sender will needlessly go 
into fast retransmit. SACK eliminates this problem 
as it will be able to inform the TCP sender about 
the gaps in the receiving window. This leveraging 
is possible because the HACK and SACK have dis-
joint sets of operations, thus preventing any con-
flicts during packet processing. However, it must 
be re-emphasised that HACK without SACK is still 
much better than just SACK alone (albeit with po-
tentially more out of order packets being gener-
ated). Thus both SACK and HACK can benefit 
very nicely from each other’s properties.  
 
To clearly show how well HACK performs in 
bursty error conditions, we compared the time se-
quence graphs (TSG) of HACK, SACK and 
HACK+SACK for 5% error probability with a 
burst error length of 5 packets. Tcptrace [Ost97] 
was used to generate the TSG graphs (as xplot 
[She97] data files) from our tcpdump capture files 
of the data transferred between the server and the 
client during the experiment. Xplot was used to 
display the TSG graphs and we captured the output 
on the screen using a screen capture utility. The 
TSG for HACK+SACK is shown in Fig. 14, HACK 
in Fig. 15 and SACK in Fig. 16. It can be seen that 
HACK and HACK+SACK perform much better 
than SACK  in keeping the data pipe flowing in the 
presence of burst errors as they do not have long 
periods of idle activity / timeouts (shown as long 
0
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Fig 9. Throughput versus percentage packet loss for long latency (300 ms) link with random single packet errors 
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horizontal lines in the TSG indicating that the 
sequence number for the TCP connection has not 
increased during that time period). HACK+SACK 
works better than HACK due to the reasons men-
tioned previously. It must be noted that the time 
scale of the various TSG graphs are different and 
that SACK takes a much longer time to finish than 
both HACK and HACK+SACK. This is shown in 
Fig. 17 which displays the instantaneous through-
put versus time. As can be seen, SACK takes about 
2600 seconds to finish as compared to about 430 
seconds for HACK and 140 seconds for 
HACK+SACK.  Thus HACK and HACK+SACK 
enjoy a much higher throughput than SACK in 
bursty error conditions. 
 
5.3 Effect of Window Sizes 
 
So far in our experiments, we kept the window size 
large enough not to be a bottleneck. Next, we con-
sider the effect of smaller window size on the per-
formance of HACK and SACK. It is clear that 
when there are a number of errors and window size 
is small, more timeouts and hence slow starts are 
likely to occur, resulting in throughput degradation. 
However, HACK will keep the pipe flowing be-
cause of the `special' ACKs, and hence will result 
in better throughput. To confirm this, we compared 
the effects of various window sizes on SACK and 
HACK. We ran this experiment over long latency 
links for burst errors with burst lengths ranging 
from 1 to 10 packets. We transferred 256 KB of 
data from the client to the server with two distinct 
window sizes: 16KB and 64KB. Figs. 18 – 20 show 
the throughput of the various TCP schemes under 
different burst error lengths for burst error prob-
abilities of 2%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, for a 
window size of 16 KB. As can be seen, HACK per-
forms better than SACK even when the window 
size is small (thus becoming a limiting factor in 
determining the amount of data that can be sent 
over a link), and HACK+SACK performs better 
than HACK. The reasons for these improvement 
are as stated previously. Figs. 21 - 23 show the re-
sults for the same error probabilities and burst 
lengths but for a window size of 64 KB. In this case 
as well, HACK performs much better than SACK 
and HACK+SACK performs better than HACK.  
 
These results clearly show that HACK performs 
better than SACK in bursty error conditions for 
window sizes which are typically used by many 
TCP stacks (without the optional window scaling 
option enabled). Note that the superior performance 
of HACK over SACK is more prominent for 
smaller window size. 
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Fig 15. Time Sequence Graph for HACK 
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Fig 14. Time Sequence Graph for HACK+SACK 
 
Fig 16. Time Sequence Graph for SACK 
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6 Deployment 
 
In scenarios where it may be difficult to determine 
if HACK is necessary (e.g., if the end user is un-
aware of the existence of any lossy links within the 
network), a feasible solution would be to place TCP 
tunnels (similar to IP tunnels except that TCP is 
used for the encapsulation) across those links and 
enable HACK for those tunnels. 
 
These tunnels would be deployed by the network 
administrators of the lossy links. Traffic entering 
these lossy links will be encapsulated within TCP 
tunnels and these tunnels can then use the Header 
Checksum option to maximise their throughput 
over these lossy links. In this scenario, the end us-
ers do not have to change any of their software or 
even be aware of the presence of lossy links in the 
network to benefit from the use of the Header 
Checksum option. The properties of TCP tunnels is 
described in [LBJSA] and a complete system which 
provides quality of service (QoS) guarantees while 
using TCP tunnels is described in [BLJSA]. 
 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have presented the TCP Header 
Checksum extensions to TCP to recover from 
packet loss due to corruption in lossy environments. 
HACK allows  TCP to detect packet loss due to 
corruption and recover the necessary information so 
that the sender may be notified of this corruption 
allowing it to retransmit the corrupted segment 
immediately. The sender avoids throttling its send-
ing rate as the loss is not indicative of congestion. 
 
Our experiments have shown that HACK performs 
substantially better than SACK in environments 
where burst corruptions are prevalent. In these en-
vironments, SACK will time out incessantly 
whereas HACK manages to keep the data pipe 
flowing somewhat. The optimal level of perform-
ance is achieved when HACK is run together with  
SACK. 
 
Work is being done to test the effectiveness of 
HACK and HACK + SACK in situations where 
ACKs are also susceptible to packet corruption, and 
Fig 22. Throughput for 5% burst error for various burst lengths 
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Fig 20. Throughput for 10% burst error for various burst lengths 
(window size of 16KB) 
 
Fig 21. Throughput for 2% burst error for various burst lengths  
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where congestion occurs along with corruption. We 
also plan to extend our test and measurements of 
HACK to real wireless and satellite links.  
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